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RoIm & HAAS WAS RIGHT: RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT
OVERSIGHT COSTS IN PRIVATE PARTY RESPONSE ACTIONS
KARYN M. SCHMIDT*
In 1993, the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
seminal decision in which it refused to allow the United States government to
recover its costs for overseeing a cleanup conducted under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' ("CERCLA" or
"Superfund") by a private party. This decision, United States v. Rohm and Haas
Co.,2 has been criticized' by many as inconsistent with one driving principle of
Superfund-that the government recover all its costs of cleaning up sites
contaminated with hazardous substances.4
In Rohm & Haas, the Third Circuit applied a principle of constitutional
law to recognize certain limits on when an agency may recover its administrative
oversight costs from members of the regulated community.' In so doing, it
trampled upon "conventional wisdom" about the construction of the Superfund
* Karyn Schmidt is an attorney with the law firm of Robinson & McElwee in Charleston, West
Virginia. Her practice focuses on environmental law, including Superfund actions. Ms. Schmidt
received her B.S. from James Madison University in 1988 and her J.D. from the College of William
and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law in 1991.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The original statute created a trust fund, called the "Superfund," based
on taxes on the petroleum and chemical industries, which was authorized to receive funding in
excess of $1 billion. CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). This article uses "Superfund" and
"CERCLA" interchangeably.
2. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993). The United States chose not
to pursue review by the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Atlas Minerals &
Chems., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 639, 649 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
3. See Mildred Jacob, Note, Government Reimbursement of Costs To Oversee Private Party Clean
Up Actions: An Analysis of United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 57 ALB. L. REV. 1255 (1994)
(arguing that the Third Circuit's analysis in Rohm & Haas was flawed).
4. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). CERCLA was first
enacted in 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675). The statute was, at least in part, a congressional response to publicity concerning
Love Canal, Times Beach, Valley of the Drums and similar sites. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-10 (1980); see also Sharon L. McCarthy, Note, CERCL4 Cleanup Costs Under
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: Property Damage or Economic Damage?, 56
FORDHAM L. REv. 1169, 1169-74 (1988) (reviewing the development of CERCLA in partial
response to notorious environmental events). The statute was amended in 1986 by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), which resulted in substantive changes to the
statute as well as authorization for additional funding. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
5. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d 1265.
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statute, and focused attention on a more comprehensive jurisprudential approach
to the statute. This article examines the decision itself, considers subsequent
applications of the Rohm & Haas decision, and concludes that the Third Circuit
was on the correct path toward a more appropriate construction of the statute.
I. LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
A. Statutory Background
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980.6 The original statute created the
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund to be used for the cleanup of
hazardous substances7 released8 into the environment.9 CERCLA was amended
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
7. The statute defines "hazardous substance" in relation to a variety of other environmental statutes.
This definition is broader than "hazardous waste."
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant
to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any
hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to
section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not
including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412], and
(F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to
which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15.
The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not
include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
8. The statute defines "release" as:
[A]ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other
closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons
solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may
assert against the employer of such persons, (3) emissions from the engine
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircrafl vessel, or pipeline pumping
station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from
a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
[42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements with respect
to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under
254 [Vol. 19:253
by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act ("SARA")'0 in 1986,
which eliminated the original trust fund and replaced it with the Hazardous
Substance Superfund." The Superfund funds government cleanups 2 of releases
of hazardous substances into the environment. Cleanup action, whether by the
government or private parties, is generally called "response action."' 3
In addition to establishing the Superfund itself, the statute establishes a
variety of mechanisms for governments and private parties14 to clean up
contaminated sites and seek compensation from responsible parties for the costs
of cleanup. The statute empowers the federal government to clean up sites itself
and then sue for compensation, 5 or to order responsible parties to undertake a
cleanup action. 6 This article focuses on cost recovery actions conducted by
governments, rather than those undertaken by private parties.
One of the more common methods for the government to effect site
cleanup is for it to undertake emergency cleanup action and the initial site
investigation and study plan itself. After identifying potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs") and issuing its administrative remedy selection, Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") then seeks to have the responsible parties undertake
section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes of section 9604
of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct or
special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section
7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
Id. § 9601(22).
9. Id. § 9631, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774 (1986).
10. Superfund Amendment & Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1613
(1986).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 9507.
12. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") may spend Superfund monies on sites listed
on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). EPA uses a hazard ranking system to determine which sites
will be added to the NPL. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. After a facility is added to the NPL, EPA may
exercise its remedial authority. Generally, EPA will then investigate the site to determine the nature
and scope of contamination in a remedial investigation/feasibility study ("RI/FS") step. Id. § 9604.
After the RI/FS is completed, EPA must select a cleanup remedy that is cost-effective and assures
protection of human health and the environment and publish this decision in its record of decision
("ROD"). Id. § 9621(a).
13. "Respond" and "response" are defined as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, [sic]
all such terms (including the terms "removal" and "remedial action") include enforcement activities
related thereto." Id. § 9601(25).
14. Private parties may conduct a cleanup and sue for response costs under a cost recovery theory
or contribution claim. Id. §§ 9607(a), 9713. See United States v. American Color & Chem. Corp.,
832 F. Supp. 106, 109 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (describing government and private party mechanisms in
CERCLA for recovery of response costs), rev'd, 832 F. Supp. 106 (3d Cir. 1978).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604,-9607.
16. Id. § 9606.
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the more permanent site cleanup through an administrative order or consent
decree.' 7
Persons who are liable" under the statute become responsible for four
categories of costs: (1) all costs of the government's removal and remedial
actions "not inconsistent" with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"); (2) any
other necessary response costs incurred by any other person "consistent" with the
NCP; (3) natural resource damages; and (4) health assessment costs. 19
17. The administrative process for cleanup is fairly complex. EPA cannot spend monies for site
remedial action unless the site is listed on the NPL, and only the worst sites, after a risk-based
ranking, are placed on the NPL. Id. § 9605(a)(8)(A)-(B); 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (Hazard
Ranking System). In general, one or more removal actions take place first, followed by a RI/FS.
40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1994). The permanent remedy is selected and published in a ROD. Id. §
300.430(f)(4)-(5). Finally, the plan for implementing the remedy is planned and executed in the
remedial design/remedial action ("RD/RA") step. Id. § 300.435. This process is explained in detail
in ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) provides for liability for the following parties:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for ...
Id. § 9607 (a)(l)-(4).
For liable parties, the statute enumerates several very limited defenses:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ...
if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned ... , and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could forseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. § 9607(b)(l)-(4).
19. CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) sets out the costs for which a liable party is responsible:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
256
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. Courts have consistently observed that because the statute is remedial in
nature,2" it must be liberally construed to assist EPA in the expedient and efficient
cleanup of hazardous substances and to hold parties responsible for contamination
liable for cleanup costs. 21 As one court stated, Congress intended that the statute
would provide for "EPA's costs [to be] recouped, the Superfund preserved, and
the taxpayers not required to shoulder the financial burden of nationwide
cleanup."22
B. Removal and Remedial Costs
Under CERCLA, parties who meet the section 107 liability trigger are
responsible for "all costs of removal or remedial action" to the federal
government, or state government, as appropriate." Liable parties are also
responsible for "any other necessary costs of response" incurred by any other
person.24 Section 107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA thus provides the starting point for
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
20. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894(5th Cir. 1993); seealsoH.R. REP.
No. 1016(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (enactment of
statute was to establish a response and funding mechanism to address abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites).
21. See, e.g, Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986) (CERCLA's two "central purposes" are to give the government the tools necessary to make
a prompt and effective response to hazardous waste sites and to make the parties responsible for the
problem bear the cost); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
(determining that, because the statute is remedial, it must be construed liberally to effect its twin
goals of prompt cleanup and financial accountability by the parties responsible); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) ("CERCLA is a remedial statute which
should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals."); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d
1497, 1503-04 (6th Cir. 1989) (interpreting recoverable costs liberally is in accordance with the
broad remedial purpose of CERCLA); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp.,
976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (construing CERCLA liberally to achieve the goals of effective
control of spread of hazardous materials and placement of cleanup costs with responsible parties);
United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526, 528-29 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the statute not in a
manner that would frustrate statutory goals unless a specific congressional intention otherwise
dictates).
22. United States v. Witco, 853 F. Supp. 139, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (standing for the
notion that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemicals should pay for
cleanup).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
24. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
1995] 257
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
consideration of response costs to which the government (state or federal) may
be entitled under the statute. The question becomes how to define "all costs of
removal or remedial action," and what constitutes these costs.
Response action is the universe of actions for which compensation may
be sought. The terms "respond" or "response" are defined as "remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms "removal" and
"remedial action") including enforcement activities related thereto." '25 Removal
actions and remedial actions are generally thought of as subsets of response
actions.
Removal actions are considered to be "emergency" or interim activities
to control an immediate threat to human health and the environment.26 The
statute defines "remove" or "removal" as:
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from
the environment, such actions as may be necessary [sic] taken in
the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the
environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor,
assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat
of release."
On its face, the definition of removal thus covers actual removal of
hazardous substances and disposal of removed material. This portion of the
definition clearly does not extend to oversight costs. The rest of the definition,
however, does extend to actions necessary to monitor the release of hazardous
substances and to the catchall category of actions necessary to address damage to
public health or the environment.
Remedial actions are generally longer term, more permanent actions. The
terms "remedy" or "remedial action" are likewise defined broadly:
Those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of
or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment,
to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so
25. Id. § 9601(25).
26. Some commentators have pointed out that the removal/remedial distinction does not make sense
in application and should be eliminated. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Removal or Remedial? The
Myth of CERCLA's Two-Response System, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1993).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
258 [Vol. 19:253
ROHM & HAAS
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment. The term
includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the
release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes,
trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of
released hazardous substances and associated contaminated
materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation
of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement
of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite
treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies,
and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such
actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment.28
Again, portions of this definition clearly do not extend to oversight
activities. The general description of remedial action, "actions consistent with a
permanent remedy . . . to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances" does not extend to oversight activities. The last portion of the
definition contains, however, a catchall provision covering any monitoring
reasonably necessary to assure that the remedial action taken protects human
health and the environment.
The issue of government recovery of oversight costs of private party
response actions and the inquiry into the point at which an oversight action is
divorced enough from an actual removal or remedial action as to lie outside the
definition of removal or remedial arises within this context. As discussed in the
following section, courts have had no difficulty determining that government
oversight of private party response action is itself a reimbursable response action.
II. RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT COSTS BEFORE
ROHM & HAAS
Historically, courts have allowed EPA to recover a broad spectrum of
costs in CERCLA cost recovery actions.29 The general approach has been to
28. Id. § 9601(24).
29. The United States may recover the costs of the following:
(a) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of danger to the
public health or welfare or the environment.
(b) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of the release
or threatened release of hazardous substances.
(c) Planning and implementation of a response action.
(d) Recovery of the costs associated with the above actions, and to enforce the
provisions of CERCLA, including the costs incurred for the staffs of the EPA
1995] 259
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construe the provisions of the statute applying to response costs liberally."0
Courts have historically treated indirect costs, including EPA oversight costs, as
recoverable response costs. The lead case in this area is New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.31 The case arose in 1984 when the State of New York brought suit
against Shore Realty Corp. ("Shore Realty") and a corporate officer to clean up
a hazardous waste disposal site that Shore Realty had purchased for
development.32 The New York Department of Environmental Conservation had
assessed site conditions, but the removal of leaking drums at the site was actually
undertaken by Shore Realty. 3
The district court held that Shore Realty was liable under CERCLA for
New York's response costs, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In affirming the
lower court's award of the State's response costs, the court held that "[t]he State's
costs in assessing the conditions of the site and supervising the removal of the
drums of hazardous waste squarely fall within CERCLA's definition of response
costs, even though the State is not undertaking to do the removal. 3 ' The court's
conclusion-that EPA supervision of drum removal conducted by a private party
was a recoverable response cost-was reached with no further analysis.
The court's decision in Shore Realty is easy to understand. It is almost
intuitively obvious that EPA has the authority, and indeed must exercise this
authority, to supervise or review response actions undertaken by a private party.
At a minimum, EPA can be expected to conduct a final compliance review of site
cleanups; in practice, EPA is extensively involved in monitoring all phases of
cleanup activities by private parties. The problem lies in equating EPA's
authority to conduct oversight activities to its ability to demand reimbursement
for exercising oversight. The court in Shore Realty made this leap without
examining the statute, and later courts continued to follow Shore Realty without
further analysis.
In 1988, defendants in another Superfund action again argued that they
should not be required to pay for government oversight costs of a private party
action. 5 In United States v. Ottati & Goss, the court conducted a bifurcated trial,
and the Department of Justice.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo.
1984), rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). Other recoverable response costs range greatly:
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989) (site security and fencing costs);
Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370,376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (medical testing and loss
of drinking water).
30. See Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (evincing congressional
intent from the definitions of removal and remedial action that response costs encompass a broad
range of activities and may be interpreted liberally.)
31. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
32. Id. at 1037.
33. Id. at 1038 n.3.
34. Id. at 1042-43.
35. United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1988).
260 [Vol. 19:253
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considering first liability and then damages.36 Between 1981 and 1982, EPA had
removed drums from the site and several years later a private party, International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. ("IMC"), began additional cleanup activity under a
court order." Under the terms of the court order, New Hampshire and EPA had
the right to monitor the cleanup work undertaken by IMC." While IMC
conducted site cleanup, New Hampshire and EPA had environmental coordinators
at the site with the authority to make suggestions to IMC contractors, conduct
sampling, and otherwise monitor cleanup activity.39 IMC also had an on-site
coordinator present during the cleanup.4" During the damages portion of the trial,
the court examined each category of costs for which the United States demanded
reimbursement.41 It awarded EPA its oversight costs42 and awarded the State its
oversight costs for monitoring the soil and drum removal operations. 3
Ottati & Goss, unfortunately, sheds little additional light on the recovery
of government oversight costs of private party actions. Clearly, the court
considered the primary issue to be the allocation of EPA's requested costs among
the defendants and the geographic portions of the site, awarding any costs
"directly attributable" to the site.44 The court declined to award EPA $336,922
in "indirect costs" which included overhead expenses such as rent, utilities,
supplies, and clerical staff, reasoning that "[t]hese indirect costs necessary to
operate the Superfund program cannot be attributed directly to the [sites], and are
therefore disallowed."'45 The court did, however, award the State its indirect
costs, and EPA its payroll and travel costs.46 Like the decision in Shore Realty,
Ottati & Goss ultimately failed to discuss, in any revealing way, whether indirect
or oversight costs are qualitatively different from other costs under CERCLA and
36. Id. at 977, 980.
37. Id. at 981.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 987-91.
42. Costs awarded to EPA included: contractor costs for the operation of mobile laboratories
during the 1981-1982 drum removal, payroll expenses for EPA personnel who worked at the site
during drum removal operations, contractor costs to produce documents for the use of the
defendants in the trial, contractor costs to testify during phase I (liability) of the trial, contractor
costs to oversee work and excavation performed by the defendant's environmental contractor at the
site in 1984, contractor costs of preparation of a cost recovery report for trial, contractor costs for
on-site organization of case files and preparation of evidence profile samples, contractor costs to
develop computer data bases for use by government trial attorneys and experts, and retention of
experts by EPA to assist in preparation for trial and to testify at trial. Id.
43. Id. at 1002.
44. The court denied EPA's request for costs incurred by an analytical laboratory because there was
insufficient data to "conclusively attribute it" to the site. Id. at 992.
45. Id. at 995.
46. Id. at 1003.
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whether there is any qualitative difference between government oversight of its
own response action versus government oversight of private party response action.
Arguments challenging EPA's method of allocating the indirect costs of
operating the Superfund program to particular cost recovery actions, as described
in Ottati & Goss, have not met with much success.47 Subsequent to Ottati &
Goss, the government developed a better explanation of how it attributes indirect
program costs to individual Superfund sites.48
The Sixth Circuit added its view to the issue of the government's
recovery of its oversight costs in United States v. R W. Meyer, Inc.49 Although
it does not address government recovery of private party response costs, R W.
Meyer is significant because the court took a sweeping view of what constitutes
recoverable response costs. In R W. Meyer, the United States had been awarded
its costs of response, including direct and indirect costs and prejudgment interest,
on a motion for summary judgment against several defendants in a CERCLA cost
recovery suit."0 On appeal before the Sixth Circuit, defendant Meyer challenged
the award of EPA's expenses which included "indirect costs," costs paid to EPA
contractors, EPA direct payroll and travel expenses, and enforcement costs of the
Department of Justice ("DOyJ). 5 1 Meyer argued that the government was entitled
to recover only those administrative costs that were related to a specific removal
action rather than those costs necessary to operate the Superfund program. 2
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by noting that CERCLA's broad
remedial purpose "supports a liberal interpretation of recoverable costs."53 The
court stated that it agreed with this approach and found "that the challenged
indirect costs are part and parcel of all costs of the removal action, which are
recoverable under CERCLA."' 4  The court explained that the indirect costs
challenged by Meyer were in fact attributable to the site at issue because they
represented the portion of EPA's overhead expenses that supported the
government's cleanup activity at the site. 5 By making this statement, the court
essentially categorized all indirect costs as direct costs, to the extent that a system
can always be devised to attribute program costs to participants.56  The Sixth
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lecarreaux, No. 90-1672, 1992 WL 108816 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 1992)
(reviewing how the Department of Justice calculates and allocates its direct and indirect CERCLA
enforcement costs and holding that the approach is equitable and not inconsistent with NCP).
48. See infra note 58.
49. 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1499.
52. Id. at 1502.
53. Id. at 1503 (citation omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. This distinction is functionally meaningless-there can always be a method devised to tax
administrative program costs to participants. The central questions are: does the statute authorize
that such costs be taxed to participants, and is such taxation procedurally and substantively fair.
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Circuit announced without compunction that "the government's total response
costs necessarily include both direct and indirect costs inherent in the cleanup
operation." '57  The court was satisfied with EPA's demonstration that it
apportioned its indirect costs in each administrative region, such as office space
for EPA employees, among all of the response actions undertaken in that region. 8
The court further stated that this allocation of indirect costs to particular sites
"effectively renders those costs direct costs attributable to a particular site."5 9
The R W. Meyer decision chose to focus on the directlindirect cost
distinction. With this issue exhausted to the benefit of the government in R W.
Meyer, defendants seeking to challenge government requests for oversight costs
needed to develop a different strategy. This strategy was developed and argued
in Rohm & Haas.
III. THE ROHM & HAAS DECISION
The Rohm & Haas case provides, to date, the most thorough analysis of
whether the government may recover its costs of overseeing a cleanup performed
by a private party.60 The case arose in connection with the cleanup of a landfill
57. 889 F.2d at 1503.
58. Id. EPA's method of calculating and allocating the indirect costs of running the Superfund
program to individual response actions is described as follows:
Essentially, the EPA determines, for each fiscal year, the total amount of EPA
overhead costs at EPA headquarters and the ten regional EPA offices that
support CERCLA response actions. EPA allocates part of the headquarters'
overhead costs that support response actions to each of its ten regional offices.
Those costs are added to each regional office's own overhead costs that support
such actions. EPA then calculates an indirect cost rate for each region each
fiscal year by dividing the region's total overhead costs attributable to
Superfund activities, plus its share of headquarters' overhead costs, by the total
number of hours billed by regional Superfund personnel in a given fiscal year.
To determine what portion of its indirect costs support a particular response
action, EPA multiplies the number of hours billed by certain regional personnel
to a particular response action by the indirect cost rate for that fiscal year.
Finally, to determine the total indirect costs attributable to a particular response
site, EPA adds the indirect costs attributed to that site for each year during
which response action occurred at that site.
Id at 1503-04.
59. Id. at 1504. See also Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 21 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 185, 195-96
(Sept. 24, 1990) (following R.W. Meyer, the court allowed government recovery of indirect
administrative costs: "[i]n so far as the indirect costs are attributable to the overhead expenses
needed to support the government's cleanup of the Verona Well Field and surrounding areas, they
are reimbursable under CERCLA"); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 822 F. Supp. 545, 554
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (following R W. Meyer and allowing recovery of indirect costs of employee labor
and overhead costs, including office supplies).
60. 2 F.3d 1265.
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in Bristol Township, Pennsylvania. 61 Rohm & Haas had owned the landfill site,
in whole and in part, from 1917 to 1978.62 The site was also partially owned, at
the time of suit, by the Bristol Township Authority and a land development
company. 3 From 1917 to 1975, Rohm & Haas used the site to dispose of solid
wastes, chemical wastes, and off-specification products from chemical and plastics
manufacture. 4 EPA began monitoring the site in 1979, and determined that
hazardous substances were present at the site in the air, soil, and groundwater.
EPA proposed adding the site to the National Priorities List ("NPL") in 1985, but
through negotiations, Rohm & Haas convinced EPA that the site should be
managed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")66 rather
than CERCLA.67 In 1987, EPA agreed to do so and removed the site from the
proposed NPL list.68
Rohin & Haas and EPA entered into an administrative consent order
under section 3008(h) of RCRA in 1989.69 The order provided that Rohin &
Haas would conduct certain cleanup activities at the site.7" The order did not
provide that Rohin & Haas would be required to compensate EPA for EPA's
costs of implementing the order.71 Rohm & Haas performed the work required
by the consent order, and EPA oversaw this activity as it was performed.72
In 1990, EPA brought a cost recovery action under section 107 of
CERCLA to recover its costs incurred since 1979 in connection with the site.73
EPA also sought a declaratory judgment for all future costs it would incur at the
site.74 The court noted that most of the costs sought by EPA were incurred by
EPA after it had notified Rohm & Haas in February 1987 that the site would be
managed under RCRA rather than CERCLA.75 The district court agreed with
EPA that Rohm & Haas was liable under CERCLA and awarded EPA its•
oversight costs. 76 The defendants, including Rohm & Haas, appealed, arguing
that oversight costs incurred by the government are not recoverable under section
61. Id. at 1268.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i).
67. 2 F.3d at 1268.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1268-69.
75. Id. at 1269.
76. Id.
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107 of CERCLA.77 The defendants argued that the government's oversight of a
private party's removal and remedial activities does not constitute a removal
action.78
As other courts have noted, CERCLA does not expressly provide for
government recovery of oversight costs, so the issue becomes one of statutory
construction.79 In shaping this construction, the court in Rohm & Haas first
addressed the issue of which standard should be used in examining the language
of CERCLA.8 ° It is at this point that Rohm & Haas departs from traditional
Superfund thinking. Rather than invoking the broad remedial purposes of the
statute and jumping to the conclusion, as other courts had done, that "all response
costs" must therefore be recoverable,"1 the Third Circuit addressed whether
administrative program costs are qualitatively different from other costs
recoverable under the statute.
82
The defendants argued that oversight costs are administrative costs for
which the standards of National Cable Television Association v. United States83
("NCTA") should apply.84 The Third Circuit observed that the NCTA standard is
that "Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the
discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the
benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether
characterized as fees or taxes, on those parties."85 Applying the NCTA analysis,
the Third Circuit reasoned that the oversight costs at issue were costs incurred by
the government in monitoring private parties' compliance with their legal
obligations and, further, that these oversight costs were incurred with the intent
to protect the public interest rather than the interests of the private parties being
overseen.86 The court concluded that the oversight costs were thus administrative
costs within the meaning of NCTA, inuring to the benefit of the public at large
rather than private parties. The court rejected arguments that the NCTA
principles were meant to be narrowly applied to cases where a regulatory agency,
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1272. The defendants argued in the alternative that, even if CERCLA does allow
government recovery of its costs of private party oversight, it does not allow recovery of oversight
costs conducted under RCRA. Id.
79. See, e.g., In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 126 B.R. 656, 662 (D. Mass. 1991), afid, 954 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Since CERCLA does not define "response costs," the issue is one of statutory
interpretation.").
80. 2 F.3d at 1273.
81. See R . Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
82. 2 F.3d at 1278-79.
83. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
84. 2 F.3d at 1273.
85. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989)).
86. Id. at 1273-74.
87. Id.
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authorized to charge and collect fees from a regulated entity, could base the fees
on the agency's total costs.8"
The Third Circuit accepted the argument of the defendants that for such
oversight costs to be charged to the defendants, the language of the statute should
reflect clear congressional intent to impose such oversight costs on a private
party. 9 The court was careful to note that the central principle of NCTA was
important to agency actions in general and that failure to apply the NCTA doctrine
in Rohm & Haas might invite other agencies to tax their costs on regulated
entities:
We believe the guiding principle of NCTA to be a sound one,
particularly as applied in this case. The budget and appropriation
process gives executive agencies an incentive to operate
efficiently and makes them accountable to the Congress. When
an agency asserts the right to secure financing of its activities by
assessing its costs against those whom it regulates, that incentive
and accountability are lost. Moreover, in the present context,
recognition of the authority EPA asserts could result in the
funding for a substantial amount of EPA activity, undertaken
under a variety of different statutes, being shifted away from
general revenue to specific levies on certain private parties..
We will not presume Congress to have intended a statute to
create the dramatic and unusual effect of requiring regulated
parties to pay a large share of the administrative costs incurred
by the overseeing agency unless the statutory language clearly
and explicitly requires that result.9"
In examining the statutory language, the court found that such explicit
congressional intent was lacking.9' The court observed that the definition of
"removal" does not contain an explicit reference to private party oversight
activities; the court also failed to find that the statute contained a statement that
Congress intended administrative and regulatory oversight costs of private party
activity to be removal costs.92 The court determined that one of the categories of
removal actions--"such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances"--should be read
88. d at 1273.
89. Id.
90. Id at 1274.
91. Id. at 1275.
92. Id.
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as referring to the actual monitoring of a release or threatened release rather than
oversight of monitoring and assessment conducted by private parties.93
Noting that Congress omitted mention of oversight costs in the definition
of removal, the court then turned to the portion of section 104(a) of CERCLA
addressing remedial investigation/feasibility studies ("RI/FSs") conducted by
private parties.94 Section 104(a) of CERCLA provides that private parties may
conduct the RI/FS at a site "only if [EPA] contracts with or arranges for a
qualified person to assist [EPA] in overseeing and reviewing the conduct of such
RI/FS and if the responsible party agrees to reimburse the Fund for any cost
incurred by [EPA] under, or in connection with, the oversight contract or
arrangement."' The court reasoned that if Congress had considered government
oversight of a private removal action to itself constitute a removal action, section
104(a) of CERCLA would have been unnecessary." The court further reasoned
93. Id at 1275-76. In a footnote, the court stated:
EPA's argument would be stronger in our view if it were predicated on the
fifth, catchall category of the removal definition--"the taking of such other
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the
public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from
a release or threat of release." Arguably, this language is broad enough to
include EPA 's oversight of [the private parties ' activities.
Id. at 1276 n.17 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court went on to suggest, however, that
this fifth category could also be read as applying only to "other actions to deal with the risk created
by the release or threat of release and not actions to oversee the performance of those who have
undertaken to deal with that risk." Id.
94. Id at 1277.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
96. 2 F.3d at 1277. An interesting twist to this argument may be that CERCLA § 11 l(c)(8) allows
the Superfund to be used for contract costs arising under CERCLA § 104(a)(1). These include:
The costs of contracts or arrangements entered into under [CERCLA §
104(a)(1)] to oversee and review the conduct of remedial investigations and
feasibility studies undertaken by persons other than the President and the costs
of appropriate Federal and State oversight of remedial activities at National
Priorities List sites resulting from consent orders or settlement agreements.
42 U.S.C. § 961 1(c)(8) (emphasis added). Consent orders and settlement agreements necessarily
assume private action. This section, therefore, may be read to allow Superfund monies to be used
for RI/FS and RD/RA oversight activities conducted by private parties. However, it does not allow
the Superfund to be used for government oversight of RD/RAs conducted by private parties pursuant
to a unilateral order issued by EPA for RD/RA activities. Id This distinction makes little logical
sense. The Rohm & Haas analysis could then be read as saying that Congress had set up a
Superfund that reimburses the government its oversight costs for private party RI/FSs, and RD/RAs
conducted by private parties under a consent order or settlement agreement, but that the government
could not sue to recoup its costs of the RD/RA.
Interestingly, CERCLA § 11 1(c)(8) does not allow the government to receive Superfund
monies if it must issue a party a unilateral CERCLA § 106 order to conduct a cleanup; rather, the
government must have the private party conduct the cleanup under an agreed order or settlement.
Id. The effect of this provision, whether intended or not, is to provide a "carrot and stick" approach
to effecting RD/RAs: the government is encouraged to have the RD/RA executed through
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that if Congress had intended the government's oversight costs of private party
response actions other than RI/FSs to be recoverable, it would have so stated.97
As additional indicia of Congress' intent, the court turned to CERCLA
section 111 which sets out six categories of costs for which Superfund makes
payment.9" The first category is for payment of governmental response costs
incurred under CERCLA section 104; 99 the fourth is for payment of certain
specified costs, including the costs of contracts entered into under
section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA to oversee RI/FSs undertaken by parties other than
EPA.00 The court reasoned that Congress had chosen to treat and define
oversight costs differently than response costs and that oversight costs are not
necessarily a subset of response costs.'0 '
After concluding that the costs of the government's oversight of private
party response action are not recoverable, the court set out those areas in which
it understood the government to be able to recover certain costs.0 2 The court
observed that "[w]here the government takes direct action to investigate, evaluate,
or monitor a release, threat of release, or a danger posed by such a problem, the
activity is a "removal" and its costs are recoverable."' 13 The court explained that
such costs would include costs of responding to a release regardless of the stage
in the Superfund process at which such activity occurred; it would also include
the government's costs, such as RI/FS costs, incurred to develop an appropriate
response at the site.10 4 The court also concluded that an independent basis for
recovery of RI/FS costs existed because Congress had expressed such intent in the
language of section 104(a) of CERCLA.0 5 The court reasoned that the costs of
directing government removal and remedial action, at any stage, would be
recoverable because section 104(b) of CERCLA authorizes the government to
undertake investigation and studies "necessary or appropriate to plan and direct
response actions."'0 6
In Rohm & Haas, the Third Circuit declined to apply a liberal
interpretation of the goals of CERCLA as an alternative to examining other
constructions of the statute that might be more compelling or appropriate. It
recognized the tension between a broadly worded remedial statute necessitating
agreement rather than unilateral order.
97. 2 F.3d at 1277.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1)-(6).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 9611(c)(8). The section also lists as chargeable to the Superfund "the costs of
appropriate Federal and State oversight of remedial activities at NPL sites resulting from consent
orders or settlement agreements." Id.
101. 2 F.3d at 1277.
102. Id. at 1278.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 2 F.3d at 1279.
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broad agency powers and the principle of statutory construction that agency
power is limited by statutory delegation. The court was reluctant to read the
statute in a way that would once again give EPA a "blank check" for recouping
its costs unless Congress explicitly gave EPA the check. That this approach of
considering the scope of agency action rather than simply giving EPA another
blank check was considered creative in light of the body of Superfund case law
is disturbing.
To the surprise of many, DOJ did not petition the United States Supreme
Court for appeal of the Rohm & Haas decision." 7 The Rohm & Haas decision
remains the law in the Third Circuit. The issue has not yet reappeared at the
circuit court level.
IV. THE WAKE OF ROHM & HAAS
A. Third Circuit Decisions
After Rohm & Haas, parties have attempted to argue that they should not
be required to pay EPA its oversight costs for response actions conducted by
private parties pursuant to consent decrees, consent orders, and unilateral orders.
District courts sitting in the Third Circuit have followed Rohm & Haas, although
to varying degrees.
In United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chemicals,"'8 the district court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered the applicability of the Rohm &
Haas decision to a consent decree that had been lodged, but not entered, with the
court at the time the Third Circuit handed down its decision. In the consent
decree, the defendants agreed to pay the federal government certain costs,
including future oversight costs, that EPA might incur in overseeing the
defendants' privately funded site remediation. 1° As soon as Rohm & Haas was
decided, the defendants sought to have the consent decree set aside or modified
as to the oversight costs. 1
The government made two arguments attacking the application of Rohm
& Haas in Atlas Minerals. The government first argued broadly that Rohm &
Haas was wrongly decided. The district court declined to address this argument
directly, noting that the Third Circuit's opinion was mandatory authority in its
107. 22 PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEM. NVS, 1994 WL 2524184 at *1 (Mar. 2, 1994).
108. 851 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
109. Id. at 647. EPA had conducted a Superfund financed emergency removal action at the site,
completed the RI/FS, and issued two RODs for the site, after which it issued unilateral
administrative orders pursuant to CERCLA § 106 requiring the defendants to implement the
remedies set out in the RODs. EPA then filed suit against the defendants seeking recovery of its
costs expended and a declaratory judgment covering future costs. The parties negotiated a consent
decree to settle the cost recovery suit. Id. at 646-47.
110. Id. at 647.
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district."' The government then argued that because the court in Rohm & Haas
did not analyze whether oversight costs are recoverable under the CERCLA
definitions of "remedy" or "remedial action," the decision should be read
narrowly to apply only to removal costs rather than remedial costs."' This
approach would allow the government to recover its oversight costs in the instant
case because the consent decree covered future oversight costs of remedial action
at the site rather than "removal" action as was considered in Rohm & Haas.
The district court agreed with the government that the Rohm & Haas
decision could be limited, if read narrowly, to oversight costs related to removal
actions."' The court noted further, however, that even though it characterized the
response action in the consent decree as "remedial" action, costs of EPA's
oversight of remedial activity undertaken pursuant to the consent decree might not
be recoverable. The court reached this conclusion because the Rohm & Haas
statutory analysis was "directly applicable" even if the results were not."'
The defendants presented several arguments to the court that it should set
aside or modify the consent decree subsequent to the Rohm & Haas decision.
First, the defendants argued that the court should read the oversight cost provision
in the decree narrowly to exclude oversight costs not recoverable under
CERCLA."5 The court declined to do so, noting that the parties to the consent
decree were bound to their agreement by principles of contract law."6 The
defendants then argued that entry of the consent decree without modification
would violate public policy because it would allow the government recovery of
oversight costs that were otherwise not recoverable by law." 7
The court recognized that the Rohm & Haas decision had been driven by
the NCTA principle of the non-delegation doctrine." 8 It then sidestepped
application of the Rohm & Haas analysis by stating that, "[i]f the oversight costs
sought here are subject to the NCTA doctrine," the government would be able to
recover its oversight costs as long as the statutory definition of "remedy" or
"remedial" unambiguously covered such oversight costs." 9 The court held that
the defendants would have other opportunities to challenge the oversight costs;
therefore, entry of the consent decree should not be precluded:
111. Id. at 649 n.1.
112. Id. at 649.
113. Id. at 649-50.
114. Id. at 650.
115. Id. at 651.
116. Id. See also Carol E. Dinkins, Negotiation and Settlement Issues in Federal Enforcement
Actions, 921 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1557, 1569 (1994) (noting the government's argument in Atlas Minerals
that the consent decree was a "binding contract" and that the court's role is to determine whether
the decree is fair to the public rather than to the parties entering into the agreement).
117. 851 F. Supp. at 651.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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After careful consideration, and mindful of the strong policy in
favor of settlement in CERCLA actions, the court concludes that
the potential NCTA problems should not bar entry of the decree.
In light of the decree's provision of procedures for resolving
disputed assessments, which makes the federal courts the ultimate
arbiters of disputes, the court finds it prudent to defer
consideration of NCTA-type challenges until costs are properly
assessed and disputed. 2 '
The court invited Congress to resolve the statutory ambiguity and EPA to
reconsider its approach toward cost recovery.' After rejecting the defendants'
arguments that the consent decree was otherwise unreasonable, 22 unfair,123 and
inconsistent with the goals of CERCLA, 24 the court granted the government's
motion for entry of the consent decree. 1
25
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed the Rohm & Haas decision
more closely in United States v. Witco Corp.'26 In Witco, EPA had conducted the
RI/FS and issued the record of decision ("ROD") for a chemical and pesticide
manufacturing facility in New Jersey.' 27 After the ROD was issued, one of the
defendants, Elf Atochem, entered into a consent decree with the United States. 28
The consent decree provided that Elf Atochem would perform and finance the
remedial design/remedial action ("RD/RA") at the site at an estimated cost of
about $47 million.129 The decree also provided that Elf Atochem would
reimburse EPA $2.7 million for past and future response costs incurred by
EPA.130
120. Id. at 652.
121. Id. The court apologized for failing to address the issue directly, stating:
The court acknowledges that deferral of the NCTA determination may create
future administrative burdens on both the parties and the court, and that
resolution of the issues now would add a stronger sense of finality to the decree.
However, subsequent developments may obviate the need to decide this question
at all. Congress might react and legislatively resolve the problem. Or, more
realistically, EPA may, in light of Rohm & Haas, re-assess the wisdom of
asserting the authority to recover certain types of oversight costs. Given the
possibility, however remote, that the government might never seek costs that
trigger a NCTA-type problem, the court will wait until such costs are sought.
Id
122. Id.
123. Id. at 652-55.
124. Id. at 655.
125. Id.
126. 853 F. Supp. 139.
127. Id. at 140.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id
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After the settlement decree was lodged with the court, the government
brought a cost recovery action against Witco to recover all other unreimbursed
past and future response costs, and for a declaratory judgment that Witco was
liable for all response costs not covered by the Elf Atochem consent decree."'
Witco made a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the government had full
relief from Elf Atochem for all costs which it was entitled to recover and that, as
a matter of law, the government could not recover future costs incurred in the
oversight of Elf Atochem's remediation activities.'32
The court in Witco defined the issue as whether government oversight
costs for private party remedial activity constitute recoverable "response costs"
under the statute.' The court declined to award the federal government its
oversight costs for site remediation, rejecting the government's argument that
Rohm & Haas was distinguishable because it dealt with a removal action rather
than a remediation action.' The court held that the statutory definition and
language concerning remedial actions "is very similar to and evinces no clearer
congressional intent than does that concerning removal actions" and declined to
distinguish Rohm & Haas, applying the Rohm & Haas analysis to the remedial
action before the court. 35
In a private cost recovery action brought by a corporation against the
United States, the Third Circuit seized the opportunity to reinforce its holding in
Rohm & Haas and indirectly validate the Witco decision. 3 6 In FMC Corp. v.
United States Department of Commerce, the government attempted to argue that
the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA'37
did not apply to the federal government's arrangement for the production of rayon
during World War H. The court held that the government was liable under the
plaintiffs theories because its regulatory activities were so extensive as to qualify
it as an "operator" and "arranger for disposal" under the statute. 1 9
The court made several comments in FMC relevant to its construction of
oversight costs. First, it noted that its conclusion in FMC was consistent with its
approach to statutory construction and in particular, with its construction of
131. Id. at 141.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 142.
134. Id. at 143.
135. Id.
136. FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
138. 29 F.3d at 835. FMC alleged that the government was responsible as an owner and operator
of the rayon manufacturing facility and for having arranged for the disposal of hazardous wastes
there. Id.
139. Id. at 840.
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CERCLA: "plain language to mean what it says." 4' Second, the court observed
that its decision in FMC was consistent with its earlier ruling in Rohm & Haas:
We also point out that our approach is consistent with United
States v. Rohm & Haas Co.... in which we refused to read the
term "removal" in CERCLA section 101(23) to include
governmental oversight of private remedial actions, in part
because we found "it highly significant that Congress omitted any
mention of oversight.., in the definition of removal." Just as
we would not read undesignated conduct into the definition of
"removal," we will not read the broad regulatory exception
advanced by the government into section 107(b) or section
120(a)(1).141
Several judges joined in a dissenting opinion, asserting that the United
States had not waived sovereign immunity and, further, that the United States'
extensive wartime regulatory activity did not rise to the level of "operator" or
"arranger" liability under the statute.14 1 In the dissent, however, the judges again
stood behind their holding in Rohm & Haas and made clear that the Rohm &
Haas opinion extended to both removal and remedial activities:
In our recent opinion in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., we
held that the government could not recover from private parties
the cost of government oversight of the removal and remedial
activity performed and paid for by a private party. We
recognized the incomparability between government and private
action, and were unwilling to read CERCLA as treating
government cleanups and private cleanups as equivalent actions
for purposes of recovery of costs. We noted that it was "far
more likely that Congress viewed EPA's overseeing of a private
party's removal activities as qualitatively different from EPA's
actually performing removal activities.' 43
With the Third Circuit on record that it intended to stick with its ruling
in Rohm & Haas, the Middle District of Pennsylvania adhered to the Rohm &
Haas decision in United States v. Serafini144 In Serafini, several defendants had
entered into a consent decree with the federal government to perform remedial
140. Id
141. Id. at 841 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 846.
143. Id. at 850 (Chief Judge Sloviter dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
144. 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1912 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1994).
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action at a landfill in Pennsylvania.'45 The government later sought to recover its
response costs, including its oversight costs for the performance of the remedial
action, from defendants who had not entered into the consent decree.'46 The court
had awarded the government $2.3 million in response costs, issuing a preliminary
award in June of 1992 and the final award in September of 1993.'
After the Rohm & Haas opinion was issued in August of 1993, the
nonsettling defendants in Serafini moved the court for reconsideration of the
consent decree. 4 The government argued that the Rohm & Haas decision
applied to removal actions, but did not apply expressly to remedial actions.'49
The court disagreed, noting that the Third Circuit had later stated that its holding
extended to both removal and remedial actions and that the court's reasoning
applied to both types of actions. 5 Accordingly, the court vacated the entire $2.3
million award of response costs.1
5
'
B. Other Courts-Questioning the Reasoning of Rohm & Haas
Districts outside the Third Circuit have shown less inclination, not
surprisingly, to adopt the Rohm & Haas analysis. Unfortunately, these courts
have not expressed a willingness to dissect the Rohm & Haas opinion; rather, the
trend is to reject Rohm & Haas out of hand.
At least two courts outside the Third Circuit have agreed with the Rohm
& Haas approach. In County of Santa Clara v. Meyers Industries,'52 the District
Court for the Northern District of California considered an argument made by the
California Department of Toxic Substances Control that Rohm & Haas had
misapplied the NCTA doctrine to CERCLA cost recovery actions by treating
cleanup costs like cable regulatory costs. The court agreed, however, with the
Rohm & Haas analysis: to a regulated entity, oversight costs functioned like
cable regulatory costs because they both served to protect the public rather than
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. No. C-92-20246 (PVT) RPA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9847 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1994).
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benefit the regulated entity."53 Unfortunately, the court chose not to address the
issue in any more detail.
The district court sitting in Maine has also considered and accepted the
application of Rohm & Haas to government recovery of oversight costs of private
party response actions. In Central Maine Power Co. v. F.J O'Connor Co., 54 the
current owner of a hazardous waste site brought a contribution action against the
former site owners to recover response costs that the current owner had incurred
to clean up the site. The current site owner, Central Maine Power ("CMP"),
requested that it be entitled to reimbursement for costs it had paid to EPA for
EPA's oversight of its cleanup activities.'55 One of the former owners of the site
argued that CMP was not entitled to contribution for the oversight costs it had
paid EPA because, under Rohm & Haas, it was under no legal obligation to make
payment to EPA in the first place.'56 Citing Rohm & Haas, the court agreed and
determined that, because CMP was not required to reimburse EPA for oversight
costs, the costs were not "necessary response costs" to which CMP was entitled
reimbursement." 7 As had the court in Santa Clara, the court in Central Maine
Power adopted the Rohm & Haas decision with little new analysis.
The District Court for the Eastern District of California has not agreed
with its sister court in the Northern District and has declined to adopt the Rohm
& Haas reasoning. In California Department of Toxic Substances Control v.
Syndergeneral Corp.,58 the court found the holding in Rohm & Haas to be
"neither binding nor persuasive" in cases where a state agency seeks to recover
its oversight costs.'59 Adopting the reasoning of an earlier decision in the Eastern
District of California, 6 the court distinguished Rohm & Haas by arguing that the
Third Circuit had considered the recovery of oversight costs by an executive
153. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that Union Pac. RRt Co. v. Public Util.
Comm 'n of Oregon, 899 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1990), was applicable, noting that the Ninth Circuit
determined that a voluntary licensing fee should not be viewed as a tax. Id. at * 10-11. In the case
before it, the court concluded that:
[TIhe cost of environmental cleanup is not voluntary. The cleanup is imposed
as a legal obligation ... [and] is not a voluntary act that they can refuse. In
the Union Pacific case, the parties could refuse to do business in Oregon. In
the case at bar, the parties must perform their obligations. Recovery of
oversight costs would be an additional fee imposed by the Department. The fee
would be for the benefit of the public not the private parties. It would thus
become a tax and should be held to the clear language standard [established in
NCTA and Rohm & Haas].
Id.
154. 838 F. Supp. 641 (D. Me. 1993).
155. Id. at 643.
156. Id. at 648.
157. Id.
158. 28 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 367, 370 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
159. Id.
160. California v. Louisiana-Pacific, No. S-89-871-LKK (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1994).
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agency of the federal government.16 ' Rohm & Haas was founded on a principle
set out in NCTA-an agency's "overstep" of its power to charge fees under a
federal statute which allowed an agency to impose "fees" in violation of the
United States Constitution's nondelegation clause. 6 The court concluded that
where a state government rather than a federal agency seeks cost recovery, the
constitutional concern for the separation of powers would not be implicated and
the Rohm & Haas result not required.163
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado has also
allowed a state to recover its costs associated with oversight of private party
cleanup activities.164 In Colorado v. United States, the court considered an action
by the state for recovery of cleanup, litigation, and oversight costs in connection
with the cleanup of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.165  Colorado requested
reimbursement, inter alia, for costs associated with cleanup and the state's
oversight of actions taken by the federal government under Colorado's delegated
RCRA program.1 66 The court allowed the recovery of these costs, taking the very
broad position that response costs need only "be incurred" for a state to seek
compensation and that the statute "does not require removal or remedial action
pursuant to CERCLA.', 67 The court reasoned that, because the terms "removal"
and "remedial" actions include enforcement action under the definition of
section 101(25) of CERCLA168 and the "concept of enforcement necessarily
encompasses oversight activities," Colorado's oversight activities could result in
recoverable response costs. 6
9
The Syndergeneral and Colorado decisions may indeed be properly
distinguishable from Rohm & Haas. States seeking oversight costs do not trigger
the nondelegation concerns of Rohm & Haas, as the court in Syndergeneral
noted. 7 Further, the ability of a state to monitor actions of the federal
government where the federal government is the responsible party may raise a
number of issues not considered in Rohm & Haas. These issues, which may be
quite novel, are not addressed here because another federal district court did
tackle the Rohm & Haas decision head on.
161. Syndergeneral, 28 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. at 370.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Colorado v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 948 (D. Colo. 1994).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 952.
167. Id.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
169. 867 F. Supp. at 952. The court pointed to the special circumstance when the state is the
enforcing agency and the federal government is the responsible party in a CERCLA cleanup, noting
that oversight authority placed only in the hands of the federal government would create a conflict
of interest. Id. at 953.
170. See Syndergeneral, 28 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. at 367.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
recently rejected the Rohm & Haas analysis on its merits. 171 In United States v.
Lowe, the defendants were engaged in the cleanup of a Superfund site pursuant
to an order issued under section 106 of CERCLA 72 The government then
negotiated a consent decree which required payment of the government's
oversight costs for remedial action at the site, with the remedial action to be
undertaken by the defendants. 7 Before the consent decree was entered by the
court, the Third Circuit issued its decision in Rohm & Haas, and certain
defendants demanded that the oversight provisions in the decree be removed. 74
The government moved for summary judgment on the issue of recoverability of
its oversight costs of the defendants' remedial action.'75
After setting out the relevant definitions from the statute, the court found
the Rohm & Haas reasoning to be unpersuasive.76 First, the court stated that
oversight costs are included within the terms of section 107(a) and the definition
contained in section 101(23) of CERCLA:
Oversight necessarily encompasses the evaluation of all stages of
the cleanup process, from the preliminary investigation through
the final treatment, destruction, disposal or removal of hazardous
substances on the site. Oversight is "necessary to prevent,
minimize or mitigate" damages to the public welfare, and
necessary to "monitor, assess, and evaluate" the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances into the
environment. 17
7
The court went on, however, to point out that the statute does not
distinguish between EPA's direct monitoring of a release and its indirect
monitoring of a private party's cleanup.1 71 The court reasoned that adoption of
the Rohm & Haas approach "would lead to the incongruous result that the EPA
could recover the costs of overseeing its own contractors, but not the costs of
overseeing those hired by the potentially responsible parties."'79 The court in
Lowe adopted the Sixth Circuit's analysis in United States v. R W. Meyer80 that
the responsible parties should bear all direct and indirect costs of site cleanup and
171. United States v. Lowe, 864 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
172. Id. at 629.
173. Id.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. Id. at 631.
177. Id. at 631, 632.
178. Id. at 632.
179. Id.
180. 889 F.2d 1497; see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text
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that "the allocation of the indirect costs to specific cleanup sites effectively
renders those costs direct costs attributable to a particular site.".... It chose, once
again, to turn the issue into one of direct versus indirect costs.
V. KEY TRONIc -WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS ABOUT
RESPONSE COSTS
The United States Supreme Court recently issued its eagerly awaited
decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States."' Although the decision addresses
the issue of the recovery of attorney's fees by private parties in CERCLA actions,
Key Tronic sheds some light on the approach the Supreme Court might take in
its construction of "response costs" under CERCLA.
In Key Tronic, the petitioner and other parties allegedly disposed of
certain chemicals contaminating a landfill. 83 Key Tronic Corp. ("Key Tronic")
settled with the state of Washington and EPA, agreeing to pay $4.2 million
towards cleanup." 4 Key Tronic then brought two CERCLA claims against
another responsible party at the site, the United States Air Force ("Air Force"). 85
Key Tronic sued the Air Force in a contribution claim, seeking partial recovery
of the $4.2 million Key Tronic had paid to EPA." 6 Key Tronic also sued the Air
Force on a cost recovery claim for an additional $ 1.2 million that Key Tronic
had incurred prior to settlement with EPA."17  The $1.2 million included
attorney's fees for: (1) identification of other PRPs at the site, including the Air
Force, (2) preparation and negotiation of the settlement agreement between Key
Tronic and EPA, and (3) prosecution of the cost recovery action for attorney's
fees."' The district court dismissed the contribution claim because the Air Force
had obtained contribution protection in its settlement agreement with the United
States. The district court considered the cost recovery claim and awarded Key
Tronic attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed, holding that Congress had
not explicitly authorized private litigants to recover legal expenses in a private
cost recovery action."1
9
In considering the issue, the Supreme Court observed that CERCLA is a
"comprehensive statute" granting the executive "broad power to command
government agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites."' 9 °
181. 864 F. Supp. at 632.
182. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
183. Id. at 1963.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1963-64.
190. Id. at 1964.
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With this framework in place, the court then moved to an analysis of attorney's
fees as a separate conceptual creature apart from the construction of the parent
statute.191 The Court noted that:
Our cases establish that attorney's fees generally are not a
recoverable cost of litigation "absent explicit congressional
authorization." Recognition of the availability of attorney's fees
therefore requires a determination that "Congress intended to set
aside this longstanding American rule of law." Neither CERCLA
§ 107, the liabilities and defenses provision, nor § 113, which
authorizes contribution claims, expressly mentions the recovery
of attorney's fees. The absence of specific reference to
attorney's fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise evinces
an intent to provide for such fees.192
To determine whether Key Tronic would be entitled to its attorney's fees
as a recoverable response cost, the Court then turned to the language of the
statute itself. The Court considered whether the definition of "response" in
section 101(25) encompasses such fees.'93 Focusing on whether the term
"enforcement activities" contained in the definition of "response" could include
attorney's fees, the Court considered first the plain language of the statute and
then the statute's legislative history. Because the plain language did not include
attorney's fees, the majority turned quickly to the legislative history of the
CERCLA and SARA enactments.
The Court noted that the 1986 SARA amendments introduced the
"enforcement activities" language.'94 Two sections of SARA expressly allow for*
an award of attorney's fees: a new section authorizing citizens' suits and an
amendment to the Attorney General's abatement action authority, permitting a
person erroneously ordered to pay response costs to recover counsel fees in
certain circumstances.' 95 The Court further noted that CERCLA expressly
authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees in certain employee discrimination
actions.196
The Court held that private parties could not recover attorney's fees for
three reasons. First, the Court reasoned that section 107's cause of action for
private parties is not explicitly set out in the statute, and because the statutory
provision only impliedly authorizes a suit, attorney's fees must be authorized with
191. Id. at 1965.
192. Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976)).
193. Id. at 1964-68.
194. Id. at 1965.
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9659(f), 9606(b)(2)(E).
196. 114 S. Ct. at 1966; see 42 U.S.C. § 9610(c).
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the clarity required by Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.197 The
Alyeska decision is well-known for establishing the "American Rule" of attorney's
fees-that each party bears its own attorney's fees unless the statute establishing
a cause of action expressly provides otherwise.1 9 Application of the Alyeska rule
thus meant that CERCLA need either specifically reference attorney's fees or
evince an intent to provide for such fees.
Second, the Court observed that Congress had included two express
provisions for fee awards in the 1986 SARA amendments without including
similar fee provisions in the private party contribution and cost recovery sections
of the statute.'99 "These omissions," the Court stated, "strongly suggest a
deliberate decision not to authorize such awards."200 Finally, the Court reasoned
that:
[1]t would stretch the plain terms of the phrase "enforcement
activities" too far to construe it as encompassing the kind of
private cost recovery action at issue in this case. Though we
offer no comment on the extent to which that phrase forms the
basis for the Government's recovery of attorney's fees through
§ 107, the term "enforcement activity" is not sufficiently explicit
to embody a private action under § 107 to recover cleanup
costs.
201
The Court went on to conclude that certain fees paid to a lawyer might
be recoverable, not as litigation-related fees barred under Alyeska, but as work
"closely tied to the actual cleanup [that] may constitute a necessary cost of
response in and of itself under the terms of § 107(a)(4)(B). '20 2 This would
include, for example, work conducted to identify other PRPs at the site.203 The
Court agreed with the district court that locating other PRPs served to increase the
likelihood that a cleanup effort would be funded and completed and that
such efforts significantly benefitted the entire cleanup effort and
served a statutory purpose apart from the reallocation of costs.
These kinds of activities are recoverable costs of response clearly
distinguishable from litigation expenses.20 4
197. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
198. Id.
199. 114 S. Ct. at 1965-67.
200. Id. at 1967.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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The Key Tronic decision sheds some light on how the Supreme Court
might approach the issue of whether response costs include government oversight
costs of private party action. For example, in considering whether the statute
created an express or implied cause of action, the court found it significant that
two of the sections of the statute enacted in 1980 did not call for the recovery of
attorney's fees, while two sections contained in the 1986 SARA amendments
did.205 The Court noted that attorney's fees issues had largely been decided by
courts, with Congress placing its imprimatur on these judicial constructions by
amending CERCLA in the SARA amendments to include "enforcement activities"
within the definition of response.0 6 The Court concluded that Congress' failure
to mention attorney's fees in the cost recovery provisions in the SARA
amendments "strongly suggest[s] a deliberate decision not to authorize such
awards."20 7 Based on the Court's approach in Key Tronic, it is reasonable to
assume that the Court might find persuasive the reasoning in Rohm & Haas that
Congress did not take the opportunity in the SARA amendments to extend the
government's ability to recover oversight costs for private party-executed RI/FSs,
which intent was spelled out in the 1980 statutory language, to other response
actions.
More importantly, the Court expressed its unwillingness to analyze the
CERCLA language allowing recovery of "all costs of response" in a vacuum. It
recognized that there was a separate rule of law-the "American
Rule"--governing the types of costs requested under the statute and it recognized
that, where an established rule of law requires the presence of explicit statutory
language to support an award of costs, this rule should be applied.08 This is
precisely what the Third Circuit did in Rohm & Haas."9 In short, the Court did
not make a simple observation, as so many lower courts have done, that the broad
remedial purposes of CERCLA demand liberal construction of its provisions and
then proceed to allow an award of costs. It did not make a policy judgment that
allowing broad recovery of all costs by private parties, including attorney's fees,
might best promote CERCLA's goal of encouraging expedient site cleanup.1
205. Id. at 1965-66. "As we have said, neither § 107 nor § 113 expressly calls for the recovery of
attorney's fees by the prevailing party. In contrast, two SARA amendments contain explicit
authority for the award of attorney's fees [42 U.S.C. §§ 9659(f), 9606(b)(2)(E)]." Id. at 1966.
206. Id. at 1966.
207. Id. at 1967. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas, noted in his dissent that
this argument "would be persuasive" if the term "enforcement activities" were ambiguous; however,
Justice Scalia stated that he believed the term "clearly includes the assertion of a valid private claim
against another private litigant." Id. at 1969.
208. Id. at 1967.
209. 2 F.3d 1265.
210. See generally Christopher D. Knopf, Breaking New Ground: Recovery of Transaction Costs
in Private CERCLA Cost-RecoveryActions, 28 WiLLAMErT L. REv. 495 (1992) (arguing that an
expansive view of the types of costs recoverable under CERCLA advances CERCLA's goal of rapid
site cleanup).
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Instead, the Court in Key Tronic analyzed the award of attorney's fees to
private party litigants in much the same way that the Third Circuit approached the
award of oversight costs to EPA in Rohm & Haas. Both began by first
considering the appropriate standard of review for the type of costs to be
awarded. Both concluded that the type of costs to be awarded required explicit
authorization by CERCLA, the governing statute. Both denied the costs requested
because the statute did not expressly provide for them.
It is also telling to note what the Court did not do in Key Tronic. After
looking to the language of the statute, it did not invoke the remedial purposes of
CERCLA as the basis for its decision. It did not consider whether allowing
private parties to recover attorney's fees would enhance the goals of CERCLA.
It did not view CERCLA as a unique statute requiring the suspension of the rules
of statutory construction. Finally, it did not seek to arrive at a result that might
be incongruous where the statute demanded another construction. There is, in
short, nothing wrong with construing a statute, as did the court in Rohm & Haas,
so that the government can recoup its oversight costs if it undertakes certain
response action itself rather than oversee a third party conducting the same
activity.
VI. THE REAUTHORIZATION SOLUTION
The issue of government recovery of its oversight costs of private party
cleanup is ripe for legislative action or Supreme Court review."z Based on DOJ's
unwillingness to pursue an appeal of Rohm & Haas, it is uncertain whether it will
choose to appeal other adverse decisions. Congress certainly has the best
opportunity to act during the reauthorization process in 1995.
Because Superfund Reauthorization failed in Congress in the 1994
session,21 2 Congress must act to reauthorize the statute in the 1995 session. A
great deal of attention has focused on larger issues such as the proposed allocation
process,"' but little has centered on issues such as whether oversight costs should
be recoverable and, if so, how the statute may be redesigned to assist EPA in
reducing administrative costs.
21 4
211. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying discussion.
212. The Clinton Administration introduced draft legislation for CERCLA reauthorization in the
House (H.R. 3800) and Senate (S. 1834) in February, 1994. See also Superfund: House Panel
Questions Reform Plan on Allocation, Exemptions, Cost Recovery, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Feb.
11, 1994). The markup vehicles (H.R. 4916 and S. 1834) ultimately died at the end of the session.
213. See, e.g., Steven M. Jawetz, The Super findReform Act of 1994: Successor Failure Is Within
EPA's Sole Discretion, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,161 (1994).
214. See generally, Norman W. Bermstien, Superfuind Reform Needs Drastic Simplification, 25
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,008 (1995) (discussing improvements to statute and administrative
inefficiency of EPA).
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The Clinton Administration's Superfund reform bill, H.R. 228,215 was
introduced in the House on January -4, 1995, the opening day of the 104th
Congress.216 H.R. 228 seeks to disavow the Rohm & Haas decision and "remedy"
the oversight cost issue by amending section 107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA to make
liable parties responsible for "all costs of removal or remedial action, including
the costs of overseeing response actions conducted by potentially responsible
parties, incurred by the United States government or a state or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 217 In addition, the bill would
amend the definitions of "respond" and "response" in section 101(25) of
CERCLA to read as follows:
The term "respond" or "response" means remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms
"removal" and "remedial action") including enforcement activities
(including attorneys' fees and expert witness fees) and oversight
activities related thereto when such activities are undertaken by
the President, a State or Indian Tribe.218
If language like that in H.R. 228 is adopted, it will largely put to bed the
oversight cost issue. The areas available to challenge would shift to procedural
ones: for example, the method of the government's allocating of Superfund
program costs to specific sites.
Of course, a statutory change entails a policy choice. The Clinton
Administration's goal, not surprisingly, is to provide additional support to EPA
in running the program. This choice may not be the best one, but it is likely to
have some support. For example, one commentator has suggested that, if the
government cannot recover its costs of overseeing private party cleanup activity,
it will abandon its "enforcement first" policy and undertake more cleanup
activities itself in order to recoup its oversight costs.211 This would tie up
available Superfund monies. The government could be expected to make this
argument in support of a statutory change providing it with clear authority to
recoup all its oversight costs.
This argument, while valid, overlooks the obverse: if parties can save
oversight costs by undertaking response action themselves, they have additional
incentive to do so. The more private parties undertake response action, the more
resources EPA has for application to other sites and activities, and the better
resources are allocated. It is anecdotal that private parties can undertake site
215. H.R. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
216. Id.; see also Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 6, 1995).
217. H.R. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403(a)(3) (1995) (emphasis added).
218. Id. § 606(5).
219. Jacob, supra note 3 at 1259-60.
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cleanup more efficiently than the government.2'" For example, the General
Accounting Office has concluded that EPA has historically failed to monitor or
manage the costs of its contractors and that this has resulted in escalated costs at
Superfund sites.22' Superfund literature is peppered with observations that EPA
is inefficient when acting on its own, with no outside or PRP pressure to
minimize costs. 222 In practice, PRPs often agree to undertake site cleanup with
the belief that they can complete site remediation themselves at a lower cost than
by having EPA undertake the cleanup. It makes good sense to encourage private
parties to undertake more response action. EPA might be easily persuaded to
agree with this preference by statutory language directing EPA to prefer private
party response action where appropriate.
There are other sound policy reasons for not imposing oversight costs on
responsible parties in Superfund actions. One relates back to the central
reasoning in Rohm & Haas: is it good policy to place the entire cost of a
regulatory program on the backs of regulated entities? Let's face it, the
Superfund program as it currently functions is inefficient, cumbersome, and
expensive. Parties frequently complain that they spend significant sums on
litigation, while administrative costs on EPA's part are also staggering.223 The
Rohm & Haas decision was careful to note that administrative agencies may
function more efficiently when they receive funding from general revenues rather
than by taxing regulated entities with the costs of running the administrative
program. In practice, EPA has no incentive to keep its operating costs down if
it can recoup those costs from regulated parties.
Aside from the inefficiency built into a system where an agency is left to
tax its own operational costs, the inequitable nature of the Superfund program
should be taken into account. Oversight costs are not only billed to big chemical
companies. They are also billed to landowners, municipalities, trucking
companies and a host of other "innocent" parties who cannot escape the CERCLA
liability yoke. Assuming that these parties participate in a cleanup effort by a
220. See Eugene P. Brandy, Note, Superfund Cost Recovery: May the Government Recover "All
Costs" Incurred Under Response Contracts?, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 975-79, 991-98 (1991)
(discussing EPA's payment of excessive contractor costs and inefficient performance ofcontractors).
221. Id. at 975 (citing to OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA, AUDIT REPORT No. E1FF9-
03-0144-010022, REPORT OF AUDITON SUPERFUND COST-PLUs-AWARD-FEE CONTRACTS 2 (1990);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-88-182, SUPERFUND CONTRACTS: EPA NEEDS
To CONTROL CONTRACTOR COSTS 9 (1988); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ITE-
51, ASSESSING CONTRACTOR USE IN SUPERFUND: A BACKGROUND PAPER OF OTA's ASSESSMENT
ON SUPERFUND IMPLEMENTATION 23 (1989)).
222. See generally Jerry L. Anderson, A Paradigmatic CERCLA Case: The Liability Lottery, 13
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1993).
223. See Don J. Debenedictis, How SuperfundMoneyls Spent, 78 A.B.A. J. 30 (1992) (up to 88%
of monies spent in Superfund suits may be for litigation and administrative costs).
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PRP group, the "innocent" players pay along with the rest. In this light, it hardly
seems fair to tax program costs on parties who are simply unlucky.224
The court in Rohm & Haas probably made the best observation about
oversight costs that Congress should consider: oversight costs of private party
response action are the agency's review of a private party complying with a legal
obligation. In no other environmental program are parties taxed the costs of
administrative overhead. If Congress is going to impose sweeping liability and
compliance requirements on private parties, there should be reasonable limits to
the agency's recovery of those costs. Congress should seek to find and define
these limits on agency action.
Clear statutory language excluding certain costs from recovery (or
including them) also avoids protracted litigation. Traditionally, awards of fees
and costs lead to additional litigation over the manner in which fees are
calculated, apportionment between defendants, and other concerns. Even if this
litigation takes place after the cleanup is completed, it depletes government funds
to defend such arguments. If fees and costs are awarded, the statute should make
appeals of the awards as streamlined as possible or provide for limited review.
If costs are not awarded, litigation on the issue is averted altogether.
The oversight costs issue will remain a difficult one until resolved by
legislative or judicial action. Until then, private parties will continue to invoke
Rohm & Haas in an attempt to avoid or diminish the effect of EPA's bills for
oversight costs of private party response action.22
224. It is likely that some of these categories of PRPs will be given some relief in Superfund
reform. See, e.g., H.R. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1995) (listing limits on liability for
certain PRPs, such as small businesses).
225. See Peter E. Hapke & Andrew N. Davis, Negotiating EPA Consent Orders and Consent
Decrees: Steering Your Client Through the Shoals, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,116 n.27
(Mar. 1994) (suggesting that parties negotiating consent decrees with EPA attempt to get EPA to
compromise on the amount of oversight costs sought, to seek such costs from nonsettling PRPs, to
review EPA's cost documentation for accuracy and consistency with the NCP, and to negotiate the
documentation that EPA will provide the PRPs to support its oversight cost bills).
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